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But this expected shift in the United States’ rela-
tion with the world may raise more questions than it 
answers. A citizen of the world in the 21st century—
what does that mean? How does citizenship today 
relate to citizenship in the past? Traditional state-
bound citizenship continues to dominate our think-
ing of who we are, at least legally, and usually also in 
how we define each other individually and collectively. 
However, there are strong tensions between tradi-
tional citizenship and the world of the 21st century. 
The state faces challenges from many sides, its impor-
tance in people’s lives eroded by the unprecedented 
transnational interaction and mobility of individuals 
and private actors. Out of this tension emerges a new 
range of perspectives on citizenship in a new era.
The contributions in this issue of Schlossplatz3 illu-
minate the concept of citizenship from various per-
spectives. Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuß open by 
recalling the long and sometimes dramatic history of 
citizenship, asking whether today there is a renais-
sance of the individual as opposed to the collective. 
Michael Goodhart goes even further, arguing 
that the idea and institutions of citizenship have to 
be re-examined so as to avoid the erosion of democ-
racy. In this context, Joslyn Trowbridge shares 
her experience with “The 21st Century Town Meeting”, 
a new technique that puts citizen engagement at the 
centre of the policy-making process. 
How to design appropriate and modern citizenship 
policies? Schlossplatz3 has put the question to two aca-
demics and one politician. Marc Howard, an expert 
on citizenship policies in the EU, presents his research 
on the conditions and driving forces of openness and 
restrictiveness. An often  overlooked aspect, he argues, 
is the role of public opinion. Christian  Joppke 
agrees with this analysis, adding that, paradoxically, 
civic integration  policies often revert to  illiberal means. 
Editorial
From the end of the Cold War through almost two decades of economic globalisation, increased trade 
and unprecedented immigration, to 9/11, the “war on 
terror” and most recently, the seemingly unfettered 
contagion of the global financial crisis, our world has 
faced and is learning to cope with challenges whose 
origins and solutions lie beyond the boundaries of 
the nation-state. The growing interconnectedness 
between nations seems a trend set to continue well 
into the future. 
Many have cited a lagging behind of political globali-
sation, hinting at the inability of some long-standing 
state institutions to cope with the pressures of our 
changing global landscape. One such institution, 
 citizenship, is uniquely representative of the push and 
pull of the old versus the new, and of the need for a 
political awakening to address the divisions and ten-
sions inherent in a rapidly changing world. 
This issue of Schlossplatz3 seeks to contribute to this 
enterprise. Taking on a range of issues and concep-
tual shifts in the nuanced landscape inhabited by citi-
zenship, the issue provides a snapshot of the debate 
over the evolution of the state and our relation to it. 
For many, the future of international governance will 
take a decisive turn on January 20 with the inaugu-
ration of a new U.S. President. In an unconventional 
pre-election speech in Berlin, Barack Obama spoke 
to popular conscience when he called himself a 
“ citizen of the world.” His moving into 1600 Pennsyl-
vania Avenue this month symbolises the need as well 
as the willingness for a new beginning. 
The turn of the century has witnessed the beginning of a  
new era in international politics. What are the implications  
for citizenship, an institution that, like few others,  
defines who we are and how we organise political life?  
This issue of Schlossplatz3 provides a snapshot of the ongoing 
debate on the past and future of citizenship.
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For wolfgang schäuble,  Germany’s  Minister of 
the Interior, the key to civic integration is common 
 values. But what if a large part of the population has 
arrived and  settled under a regime considered illegiti-
mate? Vello  Pettai’s analysis of citizenship issues in 
the newly democratic Baltic states revolves around this 
question.
So citizenship is the business of the state and its sub-
jects, right? If only it was that easy. In the world of 
business the concept of citizenship has made a recent 
appearance under the label of corporate social respon-
sibility. Roman Hrycyk disentangles the term from 
its related concepts and examines what drives com-
panies to become corporate citizens. One example of 
a firm actively engaging in corporate citizenship is 
Volkswagen. Christina Hanley outlines how the 
car maker’s corporate citizenship activities may be in 
line with its main business objectives.
How can we, as citizens, shape policies? The most 
obvious answer in a democratic state would be: go 
vote! But is it really rational to vote? Why is voting 
obligatory in some countries? Do we have a moral duty 
as citizens to vote? These questions are explored by 
three members of Schlossplatz3’s editorial team. Of 
course, active citizenship is much more than just vot-
ing. Rajash Rawal explores the new role played by 
modern communications technologies in the engage-
ment of tomorrow’s e-citizens.
We are looking forward to your comments, criticism 
and feedback.
The editors of Schlossplatz3
About us
Schlossplatz3 is a policy 
 magazine run by a student 
team at the Hertie School 
of Governance ( HSoG ). In 
our studies, we come across 
myriad fascinating and  
cross-cutting topics. We pick 
one of them for Schlossplatz3 
and look at it from the per-
spective of the public sector, 
the private sector and civil 
society—hence the super-
script “3” in our name. 
Finally settled in: The new 
home of the Hertie School  
of Governance in Berlin Mitte, 
Friedrichstraße 180.
 
 
Apart from policies, we also 
take into account current and 
future policy-makers, the 
alumni and students of the 
HSoG. In the alumni section, 
nine former MPP students 
describe how their citizenship 
has impacted their personal 
and professional lives. The 
campus spotlight this time 
has moved to the U.S., to the 
campuses of Georgetown  
and Maxwell, where two  
Hertians are currently on an  
exchange. But thanks to  
the internet, we can discuss  
even when divided by  
the Atlantic. We welcome you  
to join that discussion on  
the  Schlossplatz3 blog:  
www.hertie-school.org/
schlossplatz3
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Almost a full decade into the 21st century, citizenship has resumed 
centre stage in public and scholarly debates. Ulrich K. Preuß and  
Claus Offe, both professors at the Hertie School of Governance, 
open this issue of Schlossplatz3 by reviewing the historical roots and 
pathways of the concept of citizenship and outlining current trends.
Citizenship has experienced a renaissance as a key concept in the contemporary social sciences in 
the last twenty years—in philosophy, social and politi-
cal sciences, law and economics. Since the invention 
of the idea of citizenship by the ancient Greeks some 
2,500 years ago, its meaning has undergone many 
changes. Yet, its relevance has survived many cycles 
of ups and downs and diverse socio-political orders as 
a normative ideal, which means: as an ever contested 
normative ideal. Its vitality originates in a conception 
of social life which was unprecedented in history at 
the time of its birth, namely the principle of human 
equality. What constituted the Greek polis as the first 
distinctively political association was the principle of 
equals ruling equals in a community of citizens. 
However, as J.G.A. Pocock remarked, “equality is 
something of which only a few are capable.” This 
explains why citizenship has long been an aristocratic 
rather than a democratic principle. The governments 
of the Greek polis, of the medieval Italian city repub-
lics or of the imperial cities of the Roman-German 
Empire were governments of peers rather than of 
equals. They were socially exclusive patterns of rule. 
Still, it is not by accident that citizenship and city 
share the same etymological roots. Cities are com-
munities of citizens who, according to Machiavelli’s 
Citizenship—Back to the Future
by Ulrich K. Preuß and Claus Offe 
definition, “live at liberty under their own laws.” Cities’ 
republican character made them genuine antagonists 
of the sovereign state, the political formation which 
used coercive force as the principal means of societal 
integration and of enforcing social discipline. 
As we know, the sovereign state ultimately triumphed 
over its competitors. But not without adopting several 
constitutional elements of the city, citizenship being 
the most prominent. It was the French Revolution 
which for the first time associated the modern sover-
eign state with the idea and ideal of citizenship—in 
fact, it was like joining fire and water. In Rousseau’s 
construction of the identity of the rulers and the ruled 
the polarity between civic freedom and sovereign 
coercive power was conceptually abolished, but the 
link of citizenship with the state remained a matter of 
exclusivity—women, the poor, and other portions of 
the population were kept out of the new polity. 
The extension of the suffrage in the 19th and 20th 
centuries aimed at remedying this deficiency and in 
fact effected a growing political inclusiveness in all 
constitutional states of the West. Nevertheless, the 
intrinsic tension between the sovereign state and 
the idea of citizenship persisted despite the state’s 
democratisation. This is explained by the fact that 
mass democracy—which is what the inclusion of the 
lower classes in the polity ultimately amounts to—
was a formation which was designed for the non-
violent mastering of class conflicts in the evolving 
industrial society. It required more robust forms of 
mass participation in shaping democratic politics 
than what citizenship, in the traditional sense of hav-
ing the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in the 
elections, entailed. From the end of the 19th century 
on, the development of modern democracy is insepa-
rably connected with mass organisations like political 
parties, labour unions and concomitant associations 
It is not by accident that  
‘citizenship’ and ‘city’ share the 
same etymological roots.
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in the fields of religion, sports, recreation, consumer 
interests etc., all of which aimed at the progress of 
collective forms of life. As authors like Max Weber, 
Robert Michels or Joseph Schumpeter have pointed 
out, the institutional ideal of mass organisations is 
not the autonomy of the citizen but collective solidar-
ity, which requires a high degree of social discipline. 
In retrospect, the democratic societies of the 20th 
century have been termed “society of organisations” 
as opposed to the 19th century “society of individuals” 
(Norbert Elias). This difference indicated a tangible 
change of the character of politics. Politics became 
ever more a struggle for power of organised political 
and social agents, for whom the mobilisation of the 
collective interests and aspirations of their respec-
tive constituencies was the most efficient instrument 
of political representation, of democracy. Of course 
citizenship existed as a legal status which everybody 
shared with everybody, but its relevance was marginal. 
Paradoxically, the more polities became inclusive and 
the more citizenship status became an issue of politi-
cal empowerment and participation, the less impor-
tance was attached to its political and social dimen-
sions. Where citizenship has remained an important 
status—namely as the status of having a legal bond 
with a particular state which provides the benefits 
associated with nationality—it has maintained the 
flavour of exclusivity, particularly in democratic 
polities. Hence arises the current salience of issues 
concerning who must be granted citizenship, and on 
what conditions. 
As we stated at the outset, a major shift has occurred 
since the 1990s. How can we explain the renaissance 
of the idea of citizenship? Are we entering a world in 
which individuals, as opposed to organised collective 
actors, matter again; in which they not only make a 
difference, but in which their differences matter? 
Does the increasing interest in citizenship, in civic 
activities and in the changing role of civil society 
indicate that the social and cultural properties of indi-
viduals become ever more important because they can 
be seen as cultural resources of the ever more diverse 
societies of the 21st century? It is fair to say that the 
heydays of the “society of organisations” have passed. 
New patterns of social life and political organisation 
under conditions of cultural diversity and global 
interconnectedness of contemporary societies have 
to be imagined and conceptualised. This issue of 
Schlossplatz3 is an important part of this common 
intellectual enterprise. 
Ulrich K. Preuß teaches 
Law and Politics at the Hertie 
School of Governance. He 
holds a Doctor of Law from 
Gießen University. From 1972 
to 1996, he worked as Profes-
sor for Public Law at the Uni-
versity of Bremen. Since 1996, 
Preuß has been a Professor  
of Public Law and Politics  
at the Freie Universität Berlin.  
In 1989/90, he co-authored  
the draft of the constitution 
as a participant of the Round 
Table of the German Demo-
cratic Republic. In 1992/93  
he advised the Thuringian 
parliament on the conception 
of a new consti tution. He is  
on the advisory board of 
various research institutions 
and is a member of the Staats-
gerichtshof ( State Constitu-
tional Court ) in  Bremen. 
Claus Offe teaches Political 
Sociology at the Hertie School 
of Governance. He completed 
his PhD at the University of 
Frankfurt and his Habilitation 
at the University of Konstanz. 
He has held chairs for Political 
Science and  Political Sociology 
at the Universities of Bielefeld 
( 1975—89 ) and Bremen 
( 1989—95 ), as well as at the 
Humboldt-University of  
Berlin ( 1995—2005 ). He has  
worked as fellow and visiting 
professor at, among others,  
the Institutes for Advanced 
Study in Stanford, Princeton, 
the Australian National  
University, as well as Harvard 
University, the University  
of California at Berkeley and  
the New School University, 
New York. 
The intrinsic tension between the 
sovereign state and the idea of 
citizenship persisted despite the 
state’s democratisation.
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The Many Faces 
of Citizenship
The relationship between an individual and a state in which an indi-
vidual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is entitled to its protection. 
Citizenship implies the status of freedom with accompanying responsibili-
ties. In general, full political rights, including the right to vote and to hold 
public office, are predicated upon citizenship. The usual responsibilities of 
citizenship are allegiance, taxation and military service.  
Encyclopedia Britannica 
Citizenship is membership in a political community 
( originally a city or town but now usually a country ) and carries 
with it rights to political participation; a person having such 
membership is a citizen. It is largely coterminous with national-
ity, although it is possible to have a nationality without being 
a citizen ( i.e., be legally subject to a state and entitled to its 
protection without having rights of political participation in it );  
it is also possible to have political rights without being a 
national of a state. In most nations, a non-citizen is a non 
national and called either a foreigner or an alien. 
Wikipedia
Citizenship is one of the most coveted gifts 
that the U.S. government can bestow, and the  
most important immigration benefit that USCIS can 
grant. Most people become U.S. citizens in one  
of two ways: 
1.  By birth, either within the territory of the  
United States or to U.S. citizen parents,  
or
2.  By Naturalisation.
In addition, in 2000, Congress passed the Child 
Citizenship Act ( CCA ), which allows any child  
under the age of 18 who is adopted by a U.S. citizen  
and immigrates to the United States to acquire 
 immediate citizenship.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
We may say, first, that a citizen  
is not a citizen because he lives in  
a certain place, for resident aliens and 
slaves share in the place; nor is he  
a citizen who has no legal right except 
that of suing and being sued; for this  
right may be enjoyed under the provisions 
of a treaty. […] But the citizen whom we  
are seeking to define is a citizen in  
the strictest sense, […] and his special 
characteristic is that he shares in the 
administration of justice, and in offices. 
[…] This is the most comprehensive  
definition of a citizen, and best suits all 
those who are generally so called.
Aristotle, Politics III, Part I
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To believe that citizenship entails only voting 
and taxpaying—as so many voters and taxpayers, 
helped along by the media and cynical politicians, 
do—is to trivialise what should be a vital identity  
for women and men in a privatised world.  
Too many people think that being a consumer is 
the same thing as being a citizen. That voting is 
about nothing more than private preferences and 
‘ shopping’ for leaders. Yet the truth is, to be a citizen 
is to exercise public judgment and public liberty,  
to establish common ground, to participate regularly 
in local, regional, national and global affairs, and to 
take direct responsibility for justice and equality.  
Citizenship is not a by-product of democracy but its 
very foundation; it is not a matter of aggregating 
private interests but discovering a common will.  
The quality of democracy, then, is to be measured 
not by the quality of leaders but by the character  
of citizens. The democratic deficit reflects a failure  
of citizenship, and citizens need to stop blaming  
the leaders they elect and start looking at them-
selves. Apply this civic reasoning to the global 
financial crisis, and it turns out that the credit deficit 
is a democratic deficit, the economic meltown is  
a political meltdown; and that what is called for  
is not more economic capital but more social capital, 
more civic capital, more democratic confidence.
Benjamin Barber ( political theorist ) 
World Citizenship is not a  
replacement for national citizenship,  
but rather a new responsibility in  
this interdependent world to work 
together across national boundaries to 
secure our common fate.
World Citizenship  
( The Association of World Citizens ) 
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State of the European Union 
is, as a result, a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union supplements national 
citizenship without replacing it. It is made up of a set of fundamental rights and  
obligations enshrined in the EC Treaty among which it is worth underlining the right  
not to be discriminated on the basis of nationality.
European Commission
The term ‘citizenship’ is also used 
to refer to  involvement in public life and 
affairs—that is, to the behaviour and 
actions of a citizen. It is sometimes known 
as active citizenship. Citizenship in this  
sense is applied to a wide range of 
activities—from voting in elections and 
standing for political office to taking an 
interest in politics and current affairs.  
It refers not only to rights and responsi-
bilities laid down in the law, but also  
to general forms of behaviour—social and 
moral—which societies expect of their 
citizens.
Citizenship Foundation ( UK )
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The Politics of Citizenship 
in Europe
The interview with Marc Howard was conducted by Sophia Armanski 
in October 2008.
Schlossplatz3: How would you define citizenship? 
Marc Howard: Well, there are different definitions of 
citizenship. According to the definition that I use it is a 
legal boundary between members and non-members 
of a community. It is a formal definition of who gets a 
passport and who does not. So it is a strictly legal defi-
nition, and not about who is a good or active citizen.
In your forthcoming book “The Politics of Citi-
zenship in Europe”, what analytic approach do 
you take?
I look at citizenship policies in two ways. One is an 
historical approach, the other is focused on contem-
porary change. Historically, I am trying to account for 
why different countries have developed different tra-
ditions of citizenship. I want to provide an empirical 
baseline to look at how the countries of the EU-15 fit 
together to explain the differences. What I find is that 
there is a great deal of variation in terms of openness 
and inclusiveness of citizenship policies.
And inclusiveness means who has the right to 
become a citizen?
Exactly. Who is allowed to become a citizen either 
by birth or by naturalisation. Also, for those who 
do become citizens, are they allowed to hold dual 
citizenship? This is not about emigrants. The major 
issue is about immigrants because that is what really 
matters in terms of how diverse people are accepted. 
So I look at whether immigrants can keep their prior 
citizen ship.
What are the major determinants of this open-
ness?
In my research I found that there are two important 
historical factors. One is colonialism. A country that 
has been a major colonial power has developed many 
relationships with the outside world, with otherness, 
with different people. Even though colonialism was 
a very violent, horrible and exploitative system, the 
legacy ironically, is a positive one, based on experi-
ence with others. The other historical factor is early 
democratisation. Countries that democratised earlier 
became more civically oriented, more willing to treat 
people along civic lines. And the combination of 
those two factors goes a long way toward explaining 
the historical variations of citizenship policies.
I do not see a European identity  
in a widespread sense.
The member states of the European Union differ widely  
in their citizenship policies. Surveying history, contemporary 
political dynamics and the role of public opinion,  
Marc Howard weighs in on why.
8 Schlossplatz3
Pu
bl
ic
 S
ec
to
r
And in terms of contemporary politics, what are 
the dividing lines among EU countries?
I basically distinguish between three groups of coun-
tries. One is the historically liberal countries—that 
would be France, the UK and Ireland. And then there 
are two other groups: one comprising countries of 
liberalising change and the other of restrictive conti-
nuity. Both groups historically had relatively restric-
tive citizenship policies, but six countries (Finland, 
Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Sweden) liberalised while five countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy and Spain) did not. I am  trying 
to explain that variation. 
How about the former socialist countries that are 
now EU member states? Do their citizenship poli-
cies differ, or did they adjust to the EU-15?
No, their policies are different. Their citizenship 
policies are generally quite restrictive. In many cases 
they restored ethnically based laws from the pre-
communist era. For them this means a restoration of 
where they were before the Soviet regime, and they 
are strongly holding on to that definition. 
How do contemporary events, for example a big 
immigration wave, influence citizenship policies?
A lot of historical factors, such as colonialism, 
democratisation and communism are very important 
in explaining what direction a country takes. Contem-
porary events, on the other hand, can politicise issues 
and thereby have an effect on change and resistance 
to change. The main factor in my view is public opin-
ion. It is relatively under-acknowledged within this 
literature that people are quite xenophobic and racist.
Why is that the case?
There are a lot of arguments that can be made. Some 
people might say that it is human nature to want to be 
with others like you and to be uncomfortable around 
people who are different. This cannot be measured but 
it seems to be something hard to overcome. In other 
cases people might have real anxieties about their jobs. 
In yet other cases there are perceived fears, there are 
stereotypes. People might hear or read about a single 
act committed by an immigrant and then consciously 
and unconsciously judge every other immigrant.
Do you know of an example where it was the 
other way around, where the public opinion was 
actually in favour of liberalising citizenship?
In some cases I think public opinion is not as strongly 
against liberalisation. But usually when a country lib-
eralised its policy public opinion was absent, it was 
just not consulted. The policy was decided by elites, 
by parties in parliament, and it did not get much 
media attention. It did not have strongly mobilised 
opponents and so the whole process happened quietly. 
Where it was not quiet but loud, where it involved the 
people, the policy usually remained restrictive.
That would imply that there is a trade-off 
between inclusive citizenship policies and demo-
cratic participation?
Yes, that is the very troubling conclusion. Democracy 
and popular involvement can prompt reactions that 
are anti-democratic in terms of liberal tolerance and 
openness. That indeed is a trade-off, but the impor-
tant question is whether we want to have formal 
democracy and live with the results or whether we 
want an outcome that is liberal-democratic, in which 
case a popular vote might not be the way to achieve 
that outcome. As a scholar, I am trying to highlight 
this tension. There is a tendency to say that there is a 
democratic deficit in the EU, that we need more input 
of the people. That is probably true on many levels. 
The failure of the EU Constitution is proof that there 
is a major disconnect between European elites and 
the public. But the solution of elections and referenda 
could be problematic, too. So it is troubling in both 
ways.
Even though colonialism was a  
very violent, horrible and exploitative 
system, the legacy, ironically, is a 
more positive one of experience with 
others.
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Do you see any future for European citizenship?
I do not, really. I think it is nice that everybody has the 
same-coloured passport. There are a lot of exchanges 
within Europe. Obviously travelling is very easy, and 
the Erasmus academic exchange programme and 
easyJet are quite helpful for European integration. 
I also think there is something about being European 
beyond what it was ten or twenty years ago, but it is 
still far from being a European citizenship. When two 
Europeans meet, for example a Bulgarian and a Por-
tuguese, what do they really have in common? I just 
do not see a European identity in a widespread sense. 
For sure, there are examples in which countries have 
chosen not to have embassies in every other country 
anymore, where you can go to embassies of other EU 
countries. In the future you may even be able to go 
to an EU embassy. But I do not see national identity, 
national distinctiveness or national traditions going 
away. If anything, they are getting stronger, especially 
in Eastern Europe. Though many intellectuals are 
talking about European citizenship and the European 
public space, I do not see it emerging yet.
Apart from national belonging—what are the 
major obstacles? 
An important factor that never gets discussed is lan-
guage. Though more and more people do speak Eng-
lish, the majority are still not comfortable with it and 
the average person does not speak another European 
language. Maybe that is not such a bad thing either. I 
like diversity. I would not want to see languages and 
national traditions wiped out. That holds for immigra-
tion too, which I think should be valued in terms of 
viewing differences as a strength, not a problem. 
What is your most important advice for policy-
makers?
Be careful of simple solutions and think about how 
an issue can play out politically. Very often there 
are unintended consequences. Policies can always 
backfire. Changes should not be imposed from above. 
But at the same time be careful whether and how to 
involve public opinion in decision-making. I think 
it should be done, and I am not advocating in dark, 
smoke-filled rooms of elite decision-making discon-
nected from society in any way. But one should think 
through all of the different scenarios that can occur 
and plan several steps ahead.  
Democracy and involvement of the 
people can lead to a reaction  
that is not democratic in terms of  
liberal tolerance and openness.
Marc Morjé Howard is 
Associate Professor of  
Government at Georgetown 
University, Washington,  
and holds a PhD in Political 
Science from the University  
of California at Berkeley. 
His research and teaching 
focuses on democracy and 
democratisation, including 
civil society, immigration, 
citizenship and public opinion. 
Currently,  Howard is finishing 
a book called “The Politics 
of Citizenship in Europe” 
( Cambridge University Press, 
forth coming ).
10 Schlossplatz3
With the collapse of communism in 1989 and the transition to democracy in over a dozen coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, a great deal of 
attention has been paid not only to how democratic 
institutions have been set up, but also concerning how 
inclusive these new democratic societies have become. 
In contrast to previous waves of democratisation, 
post-communist transition states frequently brought 
with them issues not only of societal transformation, 
but in some cases of state legitimacy itself. In several 
countries, state borders were disputed, relationships 
to neighbouring countries were contested and ethnic 
tensions within countries were agitated. 
 Citizenship played an important role in determining 
where the boundaries of the new demos were going to 
be. Where these limits were defined broadly, some of 
the background tension was eased. In Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, however, these issues proved thorny 
due to the countries’ special understanding of the 
nature of statehood itself. 
For the Baltic states, release from the Soviet Union 
in 1991 was seen not as secession nor as the creation 
of newly sovereign states, but rather as the end of a 
51-year-old illegal Soviet occupation that began in the 
midst of World War II. Although seemingly pedantic 
or archaic, this perspective actually possessed consid-
erable credibility. This was not only because the Soviet 
In Search for a Modus Vivendi: 
Citizenship in the Baltics 
 
by Vello Pettai 
Citizenship was directly contested in the Baltic nations 
following the fall of the Iron Curtain. At the centre of the con- 
tro versy was whether the newly independent states had the  
right to exclude ethnic Russian settlers and their descendants.  
Vello Pettai discusses how the issue of citizenship is  
related to the process of democratisation in these countries.
As long as the somewhat anomalous 
category of “non-citizen” continues 
to exist in each country in such 
noticeable numbers, there will always 
be a question about the completeness 
of democracy.
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Union in 1940 did in fact take over the previously inde-
pendent Baltic states illegally (with military pressure, 
fake elections and the arbitrary arrest of government 
leaders), but also because of a unique “policy of non-
recognition” of this occupation among many Western 
nations. These two arguments together infused Baltic 
politicians with the sense that their independence 
was to be “restored,” not “given.” The importance 
of this particular point of departure is that a process 
of democratic transition was enmeshed in the basic 
issue of citizenship itself. Citizenship became a cen-
tral parameter of how democratisation was going to 
take place and positioned the fundamental question 
of political rights and participation front-and-centre. 
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Simply put, if the Baltic states were recognised as 
“post-occupation” states, it would be their sovereign 
right to exclude from automatic citizenship all those 
people who had settled (or were settled) on their ter-
ritory during the Soviet occupation. Depending 
on the size of these populations, the conse-
quences for democratic governance would be 
significant—the more such people there are, the more 
pressure states will feel to define citizenship narrowly. 
This relationship explains why Lithuania, with a less 
than 10% Soviet-era settler population, agreed to grant 
citizenship to all of its residents, while Estonia and 
Latvia, with over 30% of their residents falling into 
this category, debated the citizenship issue intensely.
The outcome in Estonia and Latvia was to restrict 
automatic citizenship to those who were citizens in 
1940 and their descendants. Meanwhile, Soviet-era 
immigrants and their descendants were given perma-
nent resident status, their citizenship being contin-
gent on their passing a set of naturalisation require-
ments, including a state language test and a type of 
civics exam. By 1992, the consequences of restricted 
citizenship had become clear: non-citizens made up 
32% of the population of Estonia and 30% in Latvia. 
Democracy building in both countries had gotten off 
to a much skewed start. 
Needless to say, these policy decisions by the Estonian 
and Latvian parliaments soon came under consider-
able international scrutiny. Numerous international 
organisations (including the UN, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe) sent fact-finding teams to assess 
whether basic human rights were being violated in 
the process. Moreover, because the vast majority of 
these new “non-citizens” were of ethnic Russian ori-
gin, the Russian Federation denounced Estonia and 
Latvia repeatedly and threatened various retaliatory 
measures. 
Nevertheless, both countries ultimately held their 
line and promised to implement vigorous minority 
integration programmes to help non-citizens gradu-
ally acquire citizenship. This approach was supported 
by the EU which acknowledged the two countries’ 
sovereign right to define their citizenship themselves, 
but encouraged them to work proactively on natural-
ising non-citizens over time. Both Estonia and Latvia 
intensified these efforts after 2000, in advance of their 
accession to the EU in 2004 when the number of non-
citizens would begin decreasing. By 2006, the propor-
tion of non-citizens in Estonia was down to 18%, in 
Latvia to 20%. 
While the approach of Estonia and Latvia towards citi-
zenship created much consternation in the early years 
of their independence, the degree to which the prob-
lem has begun to resolve itself through naturalisation 
and the granting of full permanent resident rights to 
non-citizens has helped both countries avoid serious 
political turmoil. Moreover, in Estonia permanent res-
idents are allowed to vote in local elections, an option 
that has also been considered at times in Latvia. To 
be sure, as long as the somewhat anomalous category 
of ‘non-citizens’ continues to exist in each country in 
such noticeable numbers, the completeness of democ-
racy in these countries will also be questioned. For the 
moment, a modus vivendi has been found that has not 
significantly eroded the actual quality of democracy 
in either country. 
Citizenship became a central 
parameter of how democratisation 
itself was going to take place.
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“Corporate Social Responsibility” and “Corporate Citizenship”  
are contemporary buzzwords. But what do the terms actually 
entail? Roman Hrycyk disentangles the concepts and elaborates 
on their implications for management theory and society at large. 
Corporate Citizenship—
Towards Companies as Community Members? 
by Roman Hrycyk
Corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship have become prominent terms in 
management literature and public discussion. In spite 
of lively academic debate, not to mention publications 
dedicated specifically to defining and conceptualis-
ing the social role of corporations, a consensus on 
what the two terms actually mean has yet to emerge. 
In order to understand what a corporate citizen is, it 
helps to examine the difference between the broadly 
defined idea of corporate social responsibility and the 
more specific idea of corporate citizenship. 
Published in 2001, the European Commission’s defini-
tion of corporate social responsibility has generated 
growing consensus in Europe about what the term 
stands for. According to the Commission, corporate 
social responsibility is a concept whereby  companies 
voluntarily integrate social and environmental con-
cerns in their business operations and interaction 
with their stakeholders. Therefore, in order to be 
considered socially responsible, a company must go 
beyond corporate compliance with legal expectations. 
At the same time, despite substantial normative 
debate in academic business literature, companies’ 
motivations for engaging in social or environmental 
activities are not considered an important element 
of the definition of corporate social responsibility or 
corporate citizenship.
The term corporate citizenship is sometimes used 
synonymously with corporate social responsibility—
often just for the sake of simplicity. Furthermore, 
the term corporate citizenship has been used rather 
loosely, with a number of academic approaches now 
associating corporate citizenship with companies’ 
political involvement or using it in reference to corpo-
rate philanthropy. Due to this multitude of definitions 
and opinions, corporate citizen can seem nebulous. 
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With their rising influence and 
activism, NGOs now spread 
information on companies and 
scandals more widely and rapidly 
than ever before.
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But corporate citizenship can also be seen as a part or 
concretion of corporate social responsibility, relating 
to proactive behaviour, civic involvement and partner-
ing with organisations—all widely accepted attributes 
of the notion of citizenship at the corporate level. 
Corporate citizenship activities entail investments in 
the social environment of a company, for which the 
company dedicates specific resources and cooper-
ates with different external partners in order to solve 
problems in its community. Different divisions of the 
company work with partners from different sectors 
and thereby act as citizens, using their own resources 
to help address specific issues. 
 
Accordingly, not every activity that deals with social 
or environmental concerns or that involves corporate 
volunteering or corporate giving can be described as 
corporate citizenship. For example, some companies 
donate large sums of money or let their employees 
work for a good cause for a day each year for non-profit 
organisations. These companies invest in corporate 
social responsibility programs by giving away money 
and labour time and thus act as philanthropists. Other 
companies give their employees a day off to work on a 
project initiated by the company itself, or along with 
other organisations, with the goal of solving a specific 
problem. These companies invest resources not only 
through labour time or money but also by consulting 
or transferring knowledge. They evaluate the ways in 
which their core competencies can contribute to solv-
ing problems and are responsive to the needs of the 
community. In doing so these companies behave as 
corporate citizens.
 
In short, while the term corporate social responsibil-
ity covers a broad range of activities (e.g. donating to 
local hospitals, investing in alternative energy, rais-
ing occupational safety standards, involving external 
stakeholders formally and informally, including 
social issues in risk assessment models), corporate 
citizenship stresses the idea of companies using 
their unique resources, including core competencies, 
knowledge and contacts, for the good of the commu-
nity. The community, it should be added, is not neces-
sarily delineated by the direct physical environment of 
the company’s headquarters or subsidiary; while the 
corporate citizenship activities of small companies 
typically focus on local communities, the social envi-
ronment of large multinationals can be global. Large 
corporations are positioned to address issues on a 
much larger scale. 
But what explains the growing number of companies 
yearning to be recognised as corporate citizens? The 
answer is anything but clear as there are a range of 
possible motivations. The ambiguity of corporate 
motives for engaging in corporate citizenship and 
corporate social responsibility is partially responsible 
for the ongoing vagueness of the notion of corporate 
citizenship. It also raises a central duality in the con-
cepts of corporate citizenship and corporate social 
responsibility, which cannot be explained without 
reference to both the companies’ strategic goals and 
the expectations placed upon them by society. 
A great deal of external pressure drives businesses 
to act as corporate citizens. This pressure comes in 
part from the general public: NGOs, the media and 
consumers. With their rising influence and activism, 
NGOs now spread information about companies and 
scandals more widely and rapidly than ever before. 
Consumers increasingly consider corporate citizen-
ship and responsibility issues when purchasing goods 
and services, and are influenced by the availability of 
information provided by NGOs, which they see as 
representing public interest. Consumer pressure is 
aided by the media, which has become increasingly 
Corporate social responsibility is a 
concept whereby companies integrate 
social and environmental concerns  
in their business operations and  
interactions with stake holders on a 
voluntary basis.
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critical of corporate citizenship activities that are 
merely a public relations exercise. Secondly, pressure 
also comes from the financial market, which has wit-
nessed a profusion of institutions fostering socially 
responsible investment; analysts asking about cor-
porate citizenship activities; and rating agencies pro-
viding information on the social and environmental 
performance of companies. 
But, external pressures are not the only reason why 
businesses put corporate citizenship on their agen-
das. Some companies considering corporate social 
responsibility and corporate citizenship a moral duty, 
and are motivated to pursue socially responsible 
policies by their inherent corporate values. Others 
are motivated by strategic interests, suggesting that 
there is a “business case” for socially responsible 
behaviour. Through intensified dialogues with stake-
holders, such companies enjoy informational advan-
tages that help them anticipate new challenges. With 
more and more job applicants interested in respon-
sible behaviour of their potential employers, well 
communicated corporate social responsibility and 
corporate citizenship initiatives can help position 
companies advantageously on the labour market as 
well. Reputational effects, increased motivation and 
enhanced soft skills of employees, or the possibility 
to differentiate one’s products from the competitors’, 
further increase companies’ strategic motivation to 
act responsibly. 
While evidence suggests that becoming a corporate 
citizen can contribute companies’ financial success, a 
number of restraining factors must also be taken into 
account. Reputation effects are less likely to occur 
when critical media detect that the corporate citizen-
ship project is merely a public relations activity. And 
the commitment from employees will not be strength-
ened if the activities are not an expression of the cor-
porate culture and therefore not genuinely supported 
or at least accepted by the staff. Actually integrating 
the ideals of citizenship is not always easy. Successful 
corporate citizenship, therefore, is about both creat-
ing change outside and inside the organisation. 
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The ambiguity of corporate  
motives for engaging in corporate  
citizenship and corporate  
social responsibility is partially 
responsible for the concept’s  
persistent vagueness.
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With Volkswagen’s corporate social responsibility programme 
as her point of reference, HSoG student Christina Hanley  
explores the “business case” for corporate citizenship.
Volkswagen’s Corporate Case 
for Citizenship 
 
by Christina Hanley
sibility at Volkswagen. Moving up the pyramid, a 
strategic approach fortified in the firm’s core values 
creates a competitive advantage and sets the stage 
for innovation. Desired—although not required—is 
philanthropy: Volkswagen can be a good corporate 
citizen, improve its reputation and boost the commu-
nities in which it operates. For Volkswagen, corporate 
citizenship stands at the tip of the pyramid as a long-
term objective.
At first glance, it is hard to distinguish which initia-
tives Volkswagen classifies as corporate social respon-
sibility and which as corporate citizenship. Since its 
corporate social responsibility model is broad, it is 
broken into themes and consists of engagement in 
environmental, social and economic development 
projects. Given that corporate citizenship is a way 
for Volkswagen to reach its broader corporate social 
responsibility goals, designated corporate citizenship 
avenues are donations (monetary and in-kind), volun-
teer activities and sponsorship. Take, for example, 
the firm’s hiv/aids prevention programme in South 
Africa. It fits within the broader corporate social 
responsibility model as a social engagement project, 
while its objectives are met through corporate citizen-
ship engagement in philanthropy and volunteerism. 
What is the business case for Volkswagen to operate an 
hiv/aids prevention programme which has had a cost 
of more than 6 million South African Rand (€430,000) 
since its inception in 2001? The 2008 unaids report 
on the Global aids Epidemic estimates that 18.1% of 
South Africa’s adults aged 15 to 49 are hiv positive. 
This massive epidemic directly and indirectly affects 
many of Volkswagen’s 6 thousand employees and the 
communities where their manufacturing is located. 
It is in the firm’s best interest to promote prevention, 
education and awareness. As the largest German 
foreign direct investor in South Africa, a large part 
of Volkswagen’s investment is spent on developing 
Market liberalisation and globalisation have proven to have many positive economic, politi-
cal and social outcomes; however, such benefits are 
rarely attained free of negative side effects. As com-
panies become more transnational, they increasingly 
operate within diverse cultural and ethical regimes 
which inform variations in regulations and standards 
from country to country. As a result, many firms adopt 
different business standards for different production 
locations. To reconcile these disparities, employees, 
shareholders, customers, governments, suppliers 
and communities increasingly demand that firms not 
only continue to generate profits but also behave in a 
socially and environmentally ethical manner. The call 
for corporations to act as responsible citizens within 
their environments is growing louder. Such demands 
raise the question whether multinational enterprises 
have an obligation to act as citizens of the world, and 
if so, how? The approach of the Volkswagen Group in 
this regard provides some useful insight.
Why would Volkswagen engage in corporate citizen-
ship activities when its core business is cars? With 
329,000 employees worldwide, 50 production sites 
and sales in over 150 countries, Volkswagen has a 
strong incentive to keep its shareholders and stake-
holders happy as well as to maintain its corporate 
reputation.
Volkswagen combines concerns for both sustain-
ability and corporate citizenship within its broad cor-
porate social responsibility framework. Envisioned 
in the shape of a pyramid, Volkswagen’s corporate 
social responsibility model specifies its required 
responsibilities at the bottom and places its desired 
objectives at the top. High-quality management prac-
tises combined with first-rate risk management and 
compliance in day-to-day business are required and 
provide the foundation of corporate social respon-
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Volkswagen can be a good corporate 
citizen, improve its reputation and 
boost the communities in which it 
operates.
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its human capital. It is therefore in the company’s 
 enlightened self-interest to have an internal corpo-
rate health centre reintegrating those living with and 
affected by hiv/aids into the workplace and sponsor-
ing targeted health campaigns. The bottom-line is 
that, aside from being the “right” or altruistic thing 
to do, corporate social responsibility makes business 
sense.
The hiv/aids prevention programme also helps to 
make Volks wagen a competitive employer. Govern-
mental provision of treatment has been slow to develop 
in South Africa and it is difficult for average citizens 
to access, let alone afford, treatment. Volkswagen’s 
provision of accessible health care to its employees 
not only contributes to the fight against hiv/aids, 
but also establishes a reputation for Volkswagen as an 
employer that does not turn a blind eye to major issues 
within its community.
The firm’s hiv/aids prevention programme suc-
cesses have garnered international recognition, 
including the Global Business Coalition award for 
“Business Excellence in the Workplace.” Volkswagen 
has been praised for its membership in the South 
African Business Coalition on hiv and aids. In 
addition, the corporation has gained recognition for 
following international voluntary environmental and 
social programmes such as the Global Compact, the 
International Labour Organisation’s Social Charter, 
and every Volkswagen manufacturing site meets the 
iso 14000 environmental standards. The combina-
tion of its local initiatives and baseline operating 
standards has also helped the firm become a member 
of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index and the 
Dow Jones Sustainability stoxx, two of the world’s 
leading tradable sustainability indices. Such recogni-
tion builds corporate value by giving Volkswagen a 
social “license to operate” which certifies the firm as 
a global corporate citizen.
However, investing in healthier, more productive 
employees and being an attractive employer recog-
nised internationally for its social efforts will only 
satisfy Volks wagen’s shareholders as long as such 
activities cause its corporate value to increase. Since 
the core objective of the firm is to increase its profits, 
shareholders and managers naturally want to ensure 
that Volkswagen’s corporate social responsibility and 
corporate citizenship involvement reaps financial 
gains. The risk, however, is that engagement in cor-
porate social responsibility activities does not guar-
antee an increase in share value. Engagement must be 
targeted effectively and there must be a business case 
for action if it is to improve the bottom line. While 
a firm should take on greater responsibility for the 
externalities it creates, its job is not to compensate 
for every task the government fails to deliver. Effec-
tively designed engagement as a global citizen can 
be a strategy to increase the bottom line as well as 
to hedge against risks that can harm profit margins, 
such as high employee turnover, negative public scru-
tiny and accidents. 
Volkswagen considers its hiv/aids prevention pro-
gramme a major success. For Volkswagen, spending 
a portion of its revenues to promote its employees’ 
education and health provides huge benefits to local 
communities and also to the firm’s productivity. More 
productive employees help their bottom line and 
investment in preventive hiv/aids measures helps 
to lower risk of high employee turnover due to illness. 
This creates not only a moral impetus, but a sound 
business case for corporate citizenship. When such 
forward-looking investments are effectively directed, 
the result can be win-win: healthier and happier 
employees and communities, positive recognition as 
well as a more productive and profitable operation. 
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The bottom-line is that aside from 
being the “right” or altruistic thing to  
do, corporate social responsibility 
makes business sense.
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Putting Citizens 
in the Driver’s Seat
 
by Joslyn Trowbridge 
Never before have citizens in the United States felt so isolated 
from policy-makers. In an attempt to reverse this trend, 
innovative engagement techniques are linking the public with 
their leaders. Joslyn Trowbridge shares her experience with  
an initiative that puts citizens in command of the policies  
that matter to them most. 
Critics of the current state of American democracy call it “polarised,” “paralysed,” and even “poi-
soned.” When citizens believe they cannot trust the 
government and that they have no influence in politi-
cal decision-making, it can be said that a democracy 
is ailing. This is the case in the U.S., where only 36% 
of Americans say they can trust the government in 
Washington to “do what is right” always or most of 
the time, and only 10% believe that people like them-
selves have a say in what the government does a “good 
deal” of the time. Under such circumstances, new 
participatory processes are needed to re-empower 
the citizenry. Fortunately, pioneering attempts to 
address the democratic deficit are underway.
 
In a small town in Southern California ten citizens 
displaying a diversity of demographic profiles huddle 
together around a table. They are listening intently 
to a woman speaking about her difficulties accessing 
health care services. A rapporteur is typing almost 
continuously on a laptop. The table’s facilitator 
glances around and, noticing both nods of agree-
ment and brows furrowed in opposition, asks one 
of the citizens to explain what he thinks California 
should focus on in its newest health care reforms. At 
the next table, citizens are discussing the potential 
New participatory processes are 
needed to re-empower the citizenry.
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ton D.C. has engaged thousands of  ordinary Ameri-
cans on key policy issues: Rebuilding Louisiana after 
Hurricane Katrina, fixing ailing state health care 
systems, ensuring an efficient and effective budget 
for a city with almost 600 thousand inhabitants, 
addressing youth obesity, and revitalising North-
eastern Ohio’s economy are key examples. The most 
famous meeting took place in Manhattan in 2002, 
when AmericaSpeaks engaged over 4,500 citizens 
in assessing plans to rebuild the World Trade Center 
site. Aptly named “Listening to the City”, the meeting 
injected citizen-centred priorities into development 
plans, resulting in commitments to re-establishing 
the street grid and expanding transit infrastructure 
in Lower Manhattan.
Based on the belief that “an educated and involved 
citizenry leads to more effective and lasting public 
policy,” the AmericaSpeaks model is unique in sev-
eral ways: the scale of engagement, the immediacy 
of impact, the representativeness of participation, 
and the explicit link to decision-makers and gover-
nance processes that ensures outcomes. Working 
with a range of governmental, private and nonprofit 
partners and using a combination of keypad poll-
ing, groupware computers, large screen projection 
and teleconferencing, AmericaSpeaks creates a level 
playing field on which citizens can be authentically 
engaged with policy issues that are directly linked 
to real governance processes and to key decision-
makers. 
for a  sliding scale of fees to reduce inequalities in 
health care affordability. The table behind them is 
engrossed in a discussion on employer mandates 
related to health care benefits. In the next town 
over, another 500 citizens are discussing the same 
issues. Periodically, some of these citizens glance up 
at large screens in the centre of the conference room 
to watch, in real time, the discussions of the citizens 
in eight other towns. Small groups of quick thinkers 
organise citizens’ thoughts, received wirelessly from 
each table’s rapporteur, into a handful of emerging 
themes—affordability, accessibility, wellness and 
prevention. At the end of the day, all 3,500 citizens in 
each of the eight locations across California pick up 
keypad polling devices and vote on their top priori-
ties for state health care reform. These priorities are 
directly passed on to decision-makers and key players 
in the California health care debate, some of whom 
have been present during the citizens’ discussions.
 
The process described above is called “the 21st Cen-
tury Town Meeting” and it has had a reinvigorating 
effect on the concept of citizenship in a healthy 
democracy—putting citizens at the centre of the pol-
icy-making process. The 21st Century Town Meeting 
is the latest development in citizen-centred engage-
ment practices. It is revolutionising what it means to 
be an ‘active citizen’ in today’s increasingly complex 
world. Through this process,  AmericaSpeaks, a non-
profit, non-partisan organisation based in Washing-
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The 21st Century Town Meeting is 
revolutionising what it means to be an 
‘active citizen’ in today’s increasingly 
complex world.
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Citizenship—An Outmoded Model? 
by Michael Goodhart
In the globalising world order, democratic ideals based on 
Westphalian understandings of state sovereignty seem destined 
for obsolescence. At the core of this conceptual crisis is a 
transformation of the meaning of citizenship. Michael Goodhart 
confronts the implications of the emerging transnational 
landscape and suggests a re-thinking of the concept of 
democracy itself.
Citizenship refers both to an ideal of political inclu-sion and to the rules and practices of political 
membership in modern states. Struggles to achieve 
the full inclusion of adults in the political life of the 
state, to close the gap between real and ideal, have 
been at the heart of modern democratic theory and 
practice for over two centuries. One way to think of 
democratisation is simply as the progressive elimina-
tion of barriers to inclusion. 
This process reflects democracy’s underlying commit-
ment to the principles of freedom and equality. These 
principles invalidate claims of natural hierarchy or 
subordination, providing the theoretical justification 
for government based on participation and consent. 
The institutional aspects of democratic citizenship 
include all mechanisms necessary to guarantee free-
dom and equality. These include: rights to vote, to 
express opinions, to form associations and to influ-
ence political decisions; rights to subsistence, educa-
tion, health care, fairness and security, without which 
those rights cannot be secure; and, finally, the various 
social and political arrangements necessary to protect 
these rights. Democracy’s singular historical insight 
has been that these rights can be secured only when 
all people have the capacity, and are entitled, to influ-
ence and contest political decisions and to defend 
their rights for themselves. 
Like the Roman god Janus,  
citizen ship has two faces. As a 
principle of inclusion it is also  
always a principle of exclusion.
Like the Roman god Janus, citizenship has two faces. 
As a principle of inclusion it is also always a principle 
of exclusion. The democratic ideal of citizenship as 
full political inclusion inside the state necessarily 
entails—indeed, is premised upon—the exclusion 
of outsiders. This exclusion follows from the idea of 
sovereignty, which has dominated modern political 
thinking, including democratic thinking, for half a 
millennium. Sovereignty, most basically, is the idea 
that states are natural containers of and vehicles 
for politics. It consists of an empirical claim about 
the exclusive, territorial configuration of political 
authority and a related normative claim that links 
this configuration to rightful rule. This fact has 
often been misunderstood. Sovereignty was never a 
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bare factual description of politics; as an account of 
political life it is demonstrably false. The notion is 
much more subtle and complex. We might call it an 
empirically-conditioned normative claim—that is, a 
claim about the appropriate organisation of politics 
whose validity is contingent upon a plausible degree 
of fit-with-the-facts. 
As a practical matter, democratic theory mostly 
evolved after and within sovereign states and essen-
tially took sovereignty for granted. Sovereignty thus 
imbued democracy with its distinctive particularity—
a particularity reflected in the exclusive or state-based 
conception of citizenship sketched above. Demo-
cratic citizenship embodies the standard, sovereign 
account of legitimate political authority linked to 
territory—the term “popular sovereignty” is quite 
revealing in this respect. As a result, an exclusive 
conception of citizenship is a condition of legitimacy 
for democratic rule. 
The exclusivity of democratic citizenship is perfectly 
consistent with the universality of democratic princi-
ples, as long as democratic aims can be independently 
achieved in every state. It would be similar to stating 
the universal goal that every student should take a 
core macroeconomics course: it is perfectly consis-
tent with this aim to divide the students into several 
seminars. This solution will be legitimate so long as 
each seminar meets the substantive macroeconomic 
requirements and can do so itself (the instructors are 
all qualified, there are adequate classrooms, all of the 
seminars can be scheduled, etc.). 
Recently, the complex set of trends, patterns, and 
processes known as globalisation has prompted a 
significant reconfiguration of political life and, with 
it, political authority. As a result, many important 
issues and challenges can no longer be addressed 
adequately or legitimately through state institutions 
alone. Intergovernmental organisations, such as the 
IMF or the World Bank and supranational authorities, 
such as the WTO and the European Union, can be 
seen as responses to globalisation and as instances 
of it: they are responses to transnational issues, and 
they themselves promote or advance globalisation. In 
such a world, the concept of sovereignty is becoming 
ever more problematic. 
   
These changes raise profound questions about the 
adequacy and legitimacy of the exclusive model of 
democratic citizenship. Interdependence undermines 
the idea that freedom and equality can be adequately 
realised and protected solely through state-based 
arrangements. Enormous asymmetries in the wealth, 
influence, and capacities of states undermine the idea 
that freedom and equality can be realised indepen-
dently in all states, even in principle. One response—
common among first-world critics—is to see glo-
balisation as a threat to democracy and to democratic 
citizenship. Here, external phenomena encroach on 
the rights and the sovereignty of citizens. 
   
How can freedom and equality be 
realised globally in light of the rapid 
transformation of politics and the 
ongoing centrality of states?
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But recall that sovereignty’s usefulness and persua-
siveness depend on a reasonable fit between its nor-
mative presuppositions and facts on the ground. If 
the facts have changed, the conception of democracy 
connected to it must also change—or risk irrelevance. 
Thus, from the perspective I have outlined, democ-
racy—the commitment to freedom and equality for 
everyone—requires us to re-think citizenship in the 
context of globalisation. Seen from the vantage point 
of contemporary political realities, the democratic 
ideal of exclusive citizenship is clearly outmoded. 
The difficulty is that while the configuration of 
political authority is changing in ways that render this 
judgment certain, we have yet to devise a normative 
alternative to modern citizenship that can fulfill the 
same functions in our much more complex political 
environment. Citizenship may be outmoded, but it 
remains, at the moment, irreplaceable. This problem 
is analogous to the problem with the carbon-based 
economy: we know it is not sustainable, but we do not 
yet have a workable replacement. 
      
Theorists have proposed various forms of global 
citizenship, but these remain vague, and their 
articulation with existing political arrangements is 
particularly problematic. Membership in informal, 
transnational discursive networks is also often men-
tioned, though it seems to fall far short of meeting the 
substantive requirements of democratic citizenship. 
Policy-makers are growing more receptive to multiple 
citizenships. India, for example, has even pioneered 
a new form of “overseas citizenship” for its nationals 
abroad. Yet these patchwork solutions cannot address 
the underlying issues.
The general outlines of the problem, at least, are clear 
enough: how can freedom and equality be realised 
globally in light of the rapid transformation of poli-
tics and the ongoing centrality of states? A systematic 
approach should begin by un-bundling the ideal and 
the institutions of citizenship, analysing their norma-
tive aims and the various institutional mechanisms 
used to realise them, and then considering how these 
aims might be re-institutionalised in today’s context. 
The focus should not be on preserving the institutions 
of citizenship but rather on finding more effective 
ways to achieve its important normative ends. 
 
Democracy—the commitment to 
freedom and equality for everyone—
requires us to re-think citizenship  
in the context of globalisation.
Michael Goodhart is a 
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Common Values—The Key to Citizenship 
 
The interview with Wolfgang Schäuble 
was conducted by Noor Naqschbandi in December 2008.
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s Minister of the Interior,  
discusses citizenship and immigration in an open society.
Schlossplatz3: Mr. Schäuble, what do you regard 
as citizenship? How does citizenship change in a 
globalised world with increased mobility? 
Wolfgang Schäuble: Citizenship or nationality is a 
legal relationship which ascribes a person to a specific 
state. Connected to citizenship are mutual rights and 
obligations, e.g. the right to diplomatic protection 
in a foreign country. The civic rights and obligations 
are important, as the political rights of participation, 
the right to vote and compulsory military service. For 
instance, the German passport enables visa-free travel 
to numerous states of the world. A person who wants 
to obtain German citizenship through naturalisa-
tion is expected to have the command of the German 
language and the willingness to integrate into our 
society. The decision to be naturalised is a personal 
decision. 
 
The process of integration is con si d - 
erably more complex than merely 
passing or failing a test consisting of 
33 questions.
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In an interview with the “Stuttgarter Zeitung” 
(9 July 2008) you emphasised that the “ German 
predominant culture” (deutsche Leitkultur) is 
much more complex than the questions asked in 
the naturalisation test. How do you define such 
a “German predominant culture”? And what is 
the relationship between the “German predomi-
nant culture” and the constitution? 
The process of integration is considerably more 
complex than to pass or fail a test consisting of 33 
questions. Integration also encompasses the ques-
tion of identification with Germany as the homeland. 
Open societies—such as the German society—are 
dependent upon a minimum of consensus, affiliation 
and common views. Terms such as “common sense”, 
“consensus on values” (Wertekonsens) but also “pre-
dominant culture” (Leitkultur) reflect this concern. 
But my advice is not to fight about words. Rather, we 
should agree that we need common values as a basis 
of our living together. At the same time, this means—
and this is also a part of the integration debate—that 
nobody has to give up his or her own cultural identity 
and that we are open enough to adjust to the cultural 
diversity that comes hand in hand with immigration. 
 
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble is 
the German Federal Minister of 
the Interior since 2005, a posi-
tion in which he has already 
served from 1989 to 1991.  
Dr. Schäuble studied law and 
economics and was awarded a  
law degree in 1971. He has 
been a member of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union ( CDU ) 
since 1965 and a member of 
the German Bundestag since 
1972. His various political 
postings have included head 
of the CDU/CSU  Parliamentary 
Group in the German Bundes-
tag from 1991 to 2000 and 
national chairman of the CDU 
from 1998 to 2000. He is a 
standing member of the CDU 
executive committee.
My advice is not to fight about words. 
Rather, we should agree that we need 
common values as a basis of our living 
together.
People who cheat or lie during the naturalisation 
process can lose their German citizenship. This 
is stipulated in a draft bill that you presented 
recently. What will be the status of persons 
whose citizenship is revoked? Will the period 
in which the citizenship can be revoked be five 
years—as stated in the current draft bill? 
People whose naturalisations are effectively with-
drawn in that context are foreigners. They require a 
right of residence, e.g. a residence permit, for their 
further stay in Germany. Presumably, the Bundesrat 
(the upper chamber of German Parliament) will have 
no objections on 19 December 2008 against the draft 
bill amending the right of citizenship. Therefore, the 
draft bill adopted by the Bundestag will remain as it 
is, and that makes it impossible to revoke a fiddled 
naturalisation after five years. 
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Perspectives 
on Voting
by Sylvia Roberge, Sébastien Eugène and Rasmus Relotius
Three members of the Schlossplatz3 editorial team
give differing views on why citizens should vote… or not. 
Why Voting Should be Compulsory
by Sylvia Roberge
In over 30 countries around the world, including 
Australia and Belgium, participating in elections is 
an obligation. None of these governments impose 
compulsory voting however; they have compulsory 
turnout—the legal obligation to show up at the poll-
ing station. In some countries, voters are even given 
the option of voting for “none of the above.” Compul-
sory turnout does not infringe on one’s liberty any 
more than the obligation to send one’s children to 
school, jury duty or bans on smoking in public places 
do. After all, elections only take place once every 
few years, whereas filling out tax forms is an annual 
ordeal! Compulsory turnout also forces governments 
to improve voter registration and polling access. It 
makes for more issues-oriented campaigns as parties 
vie for undecided voters’ support rather than that of 
their already-acquired voter base.
In most advanced democracies, low voter turnout 
raises legitimacy issues: the latest Canadian elec-
tion saw the lowest turnout since 1867, while the 
2005 German federal election saw the lowest turnout 
since 1949. Voter turnout inequality is also a press-
ing concern. In the 2005 UK parliamentary election 
there were two voters over the age of 65 for every voter 
between 18 and 24 years of age. In the 2004 U.S. elec-
tion, 56% of high school graduates voted, compared 
to 84% of those with post-graduate degrees; 48% of 
those with a total family income of less than $20,000 
voted, compared to 81% of those with family incomes 
exceeding $100,000. Thus, older, wealthier and more 
educated voters had more influence at the ballot box. 
Compulsory voting increases legitimacy because it is 
the most effective means to increase voter turnout. It 
also decreases voter turnout inequality. The end result 
is that elections buttressed by compulsory turnout 
are indicative of the entire population’s preferences, 
rather than those of the portion of the population 
which normally votes.
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Why Voting is a Moral Duty 
by Sébastien Eugène
Citizens should face a moral commitment to vote, but 
they should not be obliged to do so. 
Several arguments support the idea of voting as a 
binding moral duty. The first is a duty to democracy 
itself. Voting is a key element of democratic gover-
nance. Authority is legitimised on the condition that 
representatives are elected by a significant share of 
population. As a result, every vote serves this pur-
pose. Second, what would happen if everybody would 
abstain? A few individuals would proclaim themselves 
the rulers and opponents would have no legitimacy to 
challenge this. In this sense voting is a duty the citi-
zen owes to those who seek to represent them. Third, 
regular elections may be perceived as a renewal of the 
“social contract”. In this case not voting becomes tan-
tamount to exiting the community, and thus having 
no say on decisions taken by politicians during their 
mandate. This, a significant loss of the citizen’s rights, 
demonstrates voting as a duty unto ourselves. Lastly, 
voting is a hard-won right. Going to cast a ballot, not 
more than once a year, is the least we can do to respect 
those who struggled or died for our freedom. It may 
also encourage those who fight for their own liberty 
in authoritarian regimes. 
Although many arguments aim to push citizens to 
vote, massive political apathy is perhaps the greatest 
challenge to modern democracies. The idea of manda-
tory voting is increasingly prevalent. In fact, voting, as 
a right, is often interpreted as an obligation. But this 
does not mean that citizens should be forced into the 
ballot box. They also have the right of free speech, but 
should they be obliged to make public speeches or 
demonstrate? Moreover, to be binding, an obligation 
should punish those who do not respect it. But is it 
just to make a volunteer, who devotes valuable time to 
help homeless people, pay a fine because she abstains 
from voting? Voting empowers citizens through their 
own initiative. Let us not take the significance of this 
for granted. As a 62 year-old man argued in the New 
York Times one day before the 2008 U.S. elections: 
“Your vote is your voice, and there’s more power in it 
than in most of the things we do. It’s a lost pleasure, 
the feeling of that power.” 
Why Voting is a Waste of Time
by Rasmus Relotius
Simply put, voting is irrational—the chances of your 
vote actually influencing the outcome of an election 
are close to zero. Only if it is a tie-breaker will your 
ballot make a difference. The chances of that are 
infinitesimally low. A simple cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that you do better by staying at home than 
by wasting your time going to the ballot box. If you do 
happen to go to the ballot box, it is not due to personal 
gains you anticipate, but merely a result of either social 
conditioning—i.e. you see it as a patriotic duty—or a 
legal requirement. 
Well, you say, voting might be irrational, but casting 
a ballot is not very time intensive. But voting may 
not only be meaningless to the extent that your bal-
lot is unlikely to positively influence your preferred 
outcome—you may even harm yourself by voting, 
especially if you misunderstand the options at hand. 
Even in the simplest case, in which there are only 
two candidates whose proposals differ over only one 
policy, if you do not have sufficient knowledge about 
the issue at stake you might actually vote against 
your preferences. Reality only adds complexity. In a 
typical election the voter is confronted with several 
candidates quarreling over at least as many issues. 
The only way to ensure that you are not voting against 
your interests is to acquire thorough understanding 
of what is at stake. This, in turn, requires a great deal 
of time. 
From an economic-rationalist point of view, the 
costs of voting according to your preferences are 
extremely high. Plato argued that politics should be 
left to those who are rational and understand them. 
At the end of the day, you, the rational would-be voter, 
find yourself confronting an irreconcilable paradox: 
Staying at home you act rationally, while going to the 
ballot box your behavior is irrational. While Plato 
was explicit in stating the need for rational decision-
makers, if the rational stay at home, voting is left to 
the unreasonable.
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Citizenship Beyond the Nation State—
Can E-Governance Make it Happen?
by Rajash Rawal 
Online communication has revolutionised out private lives.  
Rajash Rawal looks at the potential role of the internet  
as a platform for transnational civic participation and in  
promoting more inclusive citizenship
Take a walk down any major street of any Western town or city and you will see more or less the 
same chain stores selling the same merchandise. 
Increasingly, our television sets beam out the same 
programmes, with some slight local dimensions. Our 
‘local’ football teams now seem to comprise as many 
nationalities as the United Nations. We are increas-
ingly confronted by the similarities between the 
previously gulf-ridden concepts of local, national and 
global. As a result, non-national forces challenge the 
traditional concepts of citizenship, causing a revalu-
ation of our previously held beliefs. Add to that the 
rise in the role of the internet in our daily lives and 
the idea of citizenship as we used to know it appear 
increasingly obsolete.
To begin, let us clarify what we mean by the concept 
of citizenship. Essentially, the basic principle of citi-
zenship is that the rights and duties of citizens within 
a country are universal. They do not depend on the 
particular circumstances of birth, race or gender. We 
can assume from this definition that such a ‘univer-
sal’ concept would naturally be open to the impacts 
of the outside world. Indeed, the citizen has gradually 
become aware that public management is becoming 
less and less nationally orientated; the influx of inter-
national capital and international regulative measures 
have ensured this. We witness the growing power of 
the global financial market and the corresponding 
erosion of national governments’ power to ensure the 
welfare of their citizens. We see the growth in interna-
tional treaties which may affect national sovereignty, 
media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch orchestrating 
the airwaves, the increase in international migration 
and more and more online activity in both social and 
political capacities. Changes are afoot. 
National borders are irrelevant in 
cyberspace. The question now  
is whether this online openness can 
be transferred into real life.
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E-government is often just seen as a cheaper delivery 
method for public services, but this narrow perception 
fails to realise the potential of the e-citizen. A future 
growth area of e-citizenship could be located in social 
networking sites such as Facebook. The way in which 
such sites can mobilise and motivate political activity 
became evident during Barack Obama’s campaign 
winning the U.S. presidency. Interestingly, many of 
President Obama’s Facebook friends come from all 
over the world. Many “facebookers” join groups to 
make statements about global concerns, and hence 
come into contact with people from other countries. 
This method of transnational social interaction has 
helped not only stimulate political mobilisation but 
also challenges previously held stereotypes and preju-
dices. Members of groups exchange messages and 
posts, building relationships which help create the 
notion that their citizenship is built less on national 
grounds but more on common concerns and issues. 
Borders have been surpassed in this respect and new 
community rules are being developed. 
What is the role of e-governance in this context? It is a 
generally accepted notion that the global information 
society needs comprehensive and effective privacy 
protection in order to build trust and confidence on 
the part of its participants, the prospective “e-citi-
zens”. Current e-government concepts mostly require 
that e-citizens reveal substantial amounts of personal 
data to be able to assume their rights to e-inclusion 
and e-participation. However, rarely are these assur-
ances given by governments or explicitly demanded 
by citizens. Instead, we volunteer information as 
required by various branches of government without 
giving it a second thought, even though the media 
is rife with stories of lost data, missing laptops and 
corrupted databases. That said, the potential advan-
tages of enhancing citizens’ trust in the usefulness of 
e-government and thereby diminishing the current 
atmosphere of political discontent greatly outweigh 
any abstract danger to the state in the form of indi-
viduals misusing the system. To do this, governments 
must make the system trustworthy with better provi-
sion for online privacy protection and data protection 
laws. Governments must free up resources to ensure 
the adequate enforcement of existing legislation and 
penalties and sanctions for privacy rights violations—
both malicious and negligent. 
E-government is often just seen  
as a cheaper delivery method  
for public services, but this narrow 
perception fails to realise  
the potential of the e-citizen.
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The concept of citizenship is undergoing a re-evalua-
tion because it is challenged by a number of primarily 
non-national forces. The sense of belonging embodied 
in citizenship has become a deeper and more inclusive 
concept spanning more than just national territory.
Citizenship is not only about community—but also 
about participation. However, this susceptible to 
be contradicted unless a suitable compromise can 
be found. One possible way is the creation of a post-
national identity that draws upon civic participation, 
e-citizenship being a potential avenue. However, the 
potential of e-government, and hence e-citizenship, 
to discriminate against certain groups within society 
must also be considered. If governments see the trans-
fer of traditional services to online services only as a 
way to save money they will miss the point and end up 
excluding various sections of the electorate. We must 
ensure that discrimination, however unintentional, is 
eradicated from e-government initiatives. Only then 
do they stand a chance of being adopted by the com-
munity towards the creation of a vibrant and modern 
notion of citizenship. 
This then brings us to one of the most important 
aspects of citizenship: belonging. Traditionally, 
people are willing to contribute to the well being 
of their fellow citizens because they feel a sense of 
communal belonging. For those who do not share 
this feeling, there are laws which insist that they 
contribute. The growth of online communities has 
begun to dispel beliefs centered on inclusion and 
exclusion. Your passport, and hence citizenship, need 
no longer be a determining factor in the way in which 
you are accepted as a member of a certain community. 
National borders are irrelevant in cyberspace. The 
question now is whether this online openness can 
be transferred into real life, where citizens are often 
reluctant to welcome outsiders. In Western Europe, 
for example, the rise of immigration concerns have 
become strong electoral issues, for instance in the 
success of Le Pen in the French Presidential Election 
of 2002, the rise of populist politics in the Netherlands 
and indeed Gordon Browns’ difficulties in face of a 
call for an immigration cap in the United Kingdom. 
Rajash Rawal is a lecturer 
at the Faculty of European 
Studies and Communication 
Management at The Hague 
University of Applied Science. 
Throughout his academic 
career, he has focused on 
contemporary political devel-
opments in Europe. Rawal is 
interested in the impact of 
electronic communication and 
cyberspace on governance 
in Europe, in particular. He is 
currently co-editing the book 
“Challenges to E-Government 
in Europe” ( forthcoming 
2009 ) in which he examines 
whether cyberterrorism 
 contradicts internet freedom.
The concept of citizenship is 
undergoing a re-evaluation because  
it is challenged by a number  
of primarily non-national forces.
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The Pitfalls of Civic Integration
The interview with Christian Joppke 
was conducted by Noor Naqschbandi in October 2008. 
Civic integration policies have liberal goals—inclusiveness and 
access—yet they are often illiberal in themselves. In his interview 
with Schlossplatz3, Christian Joppke discusses this paradox 
and other stumbling blocks towards an open society.
Schlossplatz3: How would you define citizenship? 
Christian Joppke: Essentially, citizenship is state 
membership. One should be aware of not inflating 
citizenship too much, as the hyphenated citizenships 
do. Often, one does not know what reality they are 
referring to. In many cases they are not institutionally 
definable. 
What are the legal effects of citizenship? 
I distinguish between three major ways in which 
citizenship appears in the contemporary world. The 
most elementary is state citizenship. But there is a 
second dimension concerning the rights of a citizen. 
In the debate, this dimension is often decoupled from 
state membership. T.H. Marshall talks about social 
class and citizenship without mentioning member-
ship in a state at all. He conceives of citizenship in 
terms of a gradually expanding set of rights: from 
civic and political to social rights. And there is a third 
dimension which I call “citizenship as identity”. This 
dimension refers to beliefs and values shared by the 
members of a political community. Civic integration 
policies seek to reinforce this feeling of belonging as 
a means for building cohesion, integration and unity. 
These are the three dimensions I think are relevant if 
one discusses citizenship in the context of integration 
which, however, is not the only possible context in 
which to situate the concept. 
Civic integration policies seek to 
reinforce this feeling of belonging 
as a means for building cohesion, 
integration and unity.
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In this context, how would you evaluate the 
Einbürgerungsleitfaden (integration guidelines) 
in Baden-Württemberg or the so-called Einbürge-
rungstest (naturalisation test)? Do you think 
such tests which also exist in other countries, 
for example the U.S., are useful tools?
These policies have been transferred from immigra-
tion law. It is of course logical that you expect of citi-
zenship applicants what you already expected of them 
when they first entered the country. However, this 
Einbürgerungsleitfaden is completely discriminatory. 
There is an interesting legal statement by two lawyers 
from the University of Heidelberg. They reviewed 
these guidelines and assessed them as being targeted 
at applicants from Islamic states. They also argued 
they were unconstitutional because they were asking 
for a specific loyalty, conviction or morality that a lib-
eral state cannot possibly expect from its citizens, and 
much less from newcomers. So the policy was illiberal 
in double respect and the Baden-Württemberg gov-
ernment had to take it back. These openly discrimina-
tory questions, to my best knowledge, are no longer 
asked. The fact that they raised a debate meant that 
something was wrong with this procedure from the 
very beginning. 
Referring to civic integration, you once made 
the statement that “liberal goals are pursued by 
illiberal means.” What did you mean?
This is a feature which all civic integration policies 
share. It started in the Netherlands in the early 1990s 
when there was the idea or the observation that ethnic 
minority policies, enabling migrants of various ethnic 
origins to live in their own institutional world, in fact 
meant social segregation. There was unemployment, 
welfare dependency, school failure and gross socio-
economic disparities which obviously could not be 
tackled by multiculturalist policies. So new polices 
were introduced to promote Dutch language  learning 
among newcomers and to integrate them into the offi-
cial institutions of society. But from the very begin-
ning, integration was obligatory. This, however, was 
initially a trick designed by liberal policy advisors in 
order to oblige the Dutch government to offer courses 
to help newcomers integrate. It was not meant to be 
a forceful measure of integration, but that is what it 
developed into in later incarnations. 
There was the observation that  
ethnic minority policies, enabling 
migrants of various ethnic  
origins to live in their own institu-
tional world, in fact meant social 
pillarisation.
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In many cases, public opinion has led to more 
restrictive legislation regarding citizenship. 
What role does civic education play? 
First, one has to observe that in all matters related 
to immigration, there is a peculiar gap between elite 
approaches which are overall liberal and inclusive and 
a popular resistance against immigrants, often advo-
cating to kick them out of the country and send them 
back. If the public had a stronger say in that domain, 
we would live in a different country. 
How do you explain the observation that elites 
are more liberal than the general public?
I have no good answer to that question. It is something 
that has not actually been examined in any sufficient 
detail. But these are people who are educated, people 
who travel. These are people who use the service of 
immigrants, nannies, gardeners, etc. In fact, women 
who pursue an academic career are often dependent 
on women from the Philippines or from Mexico. 
This is just a hunch, which would have to be further 
examined. There is a real dilemma with respect to 
the popular dislike of immigrants. In a liberal state 
you cannot do too much about it. You should not boss 
around and patronise people as the European Com-
mission does in its campaign against racism, treating 
people as if they needed to be re-educated. This is 
what multiculturalism in theory and practice comes 
down to: a re-education programme for the majority 
of the population. That does not work because then 
we march into an Erziehungsstaat (compulsive edu-
cational state), in which we would no longer be able 
to live freely, because somebody, the elite, would tell 
us what to think. However, that does not mean that 
there should not be policies and civic education, par-
ticularly in schools. It is vital. And there have already 
been substantial reforms of curricula. Diversity and 
tolerance are upheld as civic values. But unfortunately, 
you do not always get the liberal public that you would 
wish to have. People often think and act differently. 
Christian Joppke is a Profes-
sor of Political Science at the 
American University of Paris. 
He received a PhD in sociol-
ogy from the University of 
California at Berkeley in 1989. 
He previously held positions 
at the University of Southern 
California, the European 
University Institute, the 
University of British Columbia 
and International University 
Bremen. He has published 
widely on immigration, citizen-
ship, social movements and 
the state in Europe and North 
America. His most recent book 
is “Veil: Mirror of Identity”, 
which examines Islamic head- 
scarf laws and debates in 
Western Europe.
This is what multiculturalism in 
theory and practice comes down to:  
a re-education programme  
for the majority of the population.
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Alumni3
Gerrit Reininghaus 
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, 
 currently working in Frankfurt (Main), Germany
“Travelling as a German to Israel was the 
first time I experienced the meaning of my 
citizenship. Also, during my time in Paris 
at Sciences Po I realised that German or 
French citizenship no longer makes a dif-
ference for anybody anymore. No author-
ity recognised or even cared about where 
I lived with which citizenship as long as it 
was EU.”
Henry Haaker 
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, 
currently working in Berlin, Germany
“My German citizenship leads to thinner 
borders and more trust in my good inten-
tions. I do not have to face suspicions that 
I am a terrorist or an illegal economic refu-
gee, and I have never had to undertake an 
eight-week process just to go somewhere 
for two days in order to see a concert. 
Being at HSoG showed me how much 
potential we are locking up behind high 
entry hurdles and legal barriers.”
Tiko Ninua 
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Georgia,  
currently working in Berlin, Germany
“While thinking of citizenship, one might 
think of standing in a voting booth, 
marching down the street in support or in 
protest, or other creative ways of exercis-
ing civil rights and liberties. But the word 
also brings different images: long queues 
in front of embassies; the faces of border 
guards carefully inspecting our travel 
document; spending hours in the hallways 
of the Immigration Office. And yet, there 
is a certain pride associated with citizen-
ship, the sense of a common identity and 
values.”
S
ch
lo
ss
pl
at
z3
HSoG students tend to be pretty mobile. To see whether 
and how their citizenship has played a role in their lives, 
Schlossplatz3 asked the alumni for their opinion:
What does citizenship mean to you?
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Katri Kempainnen-Bertram 
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Finland,  
currently working in Berlin, German
“Being a citizen of an EU member state 
has always made life easier, both within 
Europe as well as when traveling in other 
regions. The only real downside I have ever 
experienced is in terms of country quotas 
in international organisations.”
Ivan Capriles 
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Venezuela, 
currently working in Berlin, Germany
“I have been moving around frequently for 
about a decade. Hence, for me citizenship 
has to do with border-crossing and being 
an ‘alien’. I am a Venezuelan citizen; this 
has enabled me to avoid certain tourist 
visa applications, or, when I forget to shave 
I am conveniently absolved of the suspi-
cion for ‘looking Middle Eastern’ from 
just a glance at my passport. Yet at other 
times, my citizenship raises eyebrows and 
I am questioned for ‘important’ national 
security reasons. Nevertheless, I am not 
required to do compulsory military service 
which is an advantage.”
Johannes Staemmler 
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Germany, 
currently working in Berlin, Germany
“I have triple citizenship. One from Sax-
ony, but that is never visible. Then I have a 
German citizenship, which I am reminded 
of when I vote. My European citizenship 
becomes more and more important when I 
travel. But the notion of citizenship as the 
color of my passport is certainly too nar-
row. During my time at HSoG, listening to 
Professors Offe and Preuß diversified my 
intellectual access-points to the idea of 
citizenship—it grew from a national tool 
of exclusion to a category of thinking.”
Stephanie Rhinehart 
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of the USA, 
 currently working in Berlin, Germany
“During my time at HSoG I realised how 
lucky I was to hold a citizenship that 
allowed me to move freely throughout the 
world. The first time I ever felt my citizen-
ship was a limitation rather than an asset 
was this year when I looked for a job in 
Germany.”
Muharram Maksudova 
MPP Class of 2008, citizen of Uzbekistan, 
currently working in Geneva, Switzerland
“Citizenship has been an issue for me, 
since it has restricted a meaningful exer-
cise of some rights and privileges freely 
enjoyed in some other countries. For 
example, civil rights: the chance to make a 
difference by your vote, freedom of expres-
sion, association—the chance to influence 
the social and political life of your country. 
Also social rights to some extent, such as 
right to a decent standard of living.”
Rizwan Bajwa 
MPP Class of 2007, citizen of Pakistan, 
 currently working in Islamabad, Pakistan
“My citizenship has led to extended hassles 
at airports where I am almost always being 
singled out for a ‘random’ check. Practical 
issues such as applying for visas become 
difficult as a consequences of my citizen-
ship.”
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Campus Spotlight
This time, the Campus  
Spotlight is cast on  
HSoG students abroad:  
Read about their experiences  
and encounters.
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Notes From Maxwell
by Ephraim Abwe Diabe
HSoG student Ephraim Abwe Diabe (MPP 
class of 2009) is currently on exchange 
at the Maxwell School of Syracuse Uni-
versity. In comparing the two schools of 
public  policy, he hightlights their many 
 differences and similarities.
When I left Berlin in August 2008 for Syra-
cuse, New York, there were no doubts in my 
mind that my experience at the Maxwell 
School of Citizenship and Public Policy 
would be rewarding. First, there were few 
other schools of public and international 
affairs that have been as comprehensively 
defined as citadels of higher education. 
Second, the school has had a long-standing 
reputation for maintaining its position at 
the head of the queue of excellence among 
institutions of public administration in the 
United States and the world at large. 
 
Barely two weeks into the semester,  
I noticed that in spite of the age difference 
between the Hertie School of Governance 
(2001) and the Maxwell School (1924), both 
institutions have a lot in common; they 
both offer highly innovative pro fessional 
Master’s Programmes which target the 
policy environment in diverse ways, inclu- 
ding challenges to civil society and democ-
racy, policy dilemmas, civic education and 
global engagement. Other similarities 
include the world-class make-up of the 
faculty in both schools, and the way the 
institutions blend theory and practice. 
From this, one could claim that the Hertie 
School regards policy and practice with 
remarkable seriousness. 
At Maxwell, it is widely held that the 
barriers which divide academic disciplines 
from one another and from the larger 
world of public life are routinely breached 
by the wide-ranging scholarly and profes-
sional backgrounds of the faculty. These 
represent a careful mix of scholars and 
practitioners, and are complemented by an 
exceptionally cosmopolitan student body. 
Furthermore, it is also with great affection 
that the students, both Maxwellian and 
Hertian, talk about their institutions. 
 
In the policy world, it takes extensive 
knowledge of a given subject, combined 
with the mannerisms of decision-making 
circles, to excel. Access to the corridors of 
power is crucial for policy students, and 
few other institutions are known to pro-
vide this better than the Hertie School and 
the Maxwell School. There is undoubtedly 
so much I will take home from my experi-
ence at Maxwell. I cherish, for instance, 
my first visit to the UN Headquarters in 
Manhattan, through the Humanitarian 
Action class at Maxwell, for the richness 
of the workshops and the quality of 
personal interactions. Still, being away 
from the characteristic  camaraderie of 
our small Hertie community in Berlin is a 
challenge. As the end of my time at Max-
well draws near, I realise how much I miss 
everything about the Hertie School—from 
hair-splitting  debates with colleagues to 
the warmth and hospitality of the Hertie 
staff and faculty.
Ephraim Abwe Diabe is a 
student of the HSoG ( class of 
2009 ).He holds a BA in  
English and French as well as 
a degree in Private Law. His 
work  experience includes, 
among others, a position with  
the UNCHRD for Central 
African Sub-Region and UN-
UPEACE Africa Programme,  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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Six Things I Love About 
Georgetown…
by Lina Huppertz
HSoG exchange student Lina Huppertz 
gives us her view on what a semester at 
Georgetown really has to offer.
1
Always a pleasure in the U.S. are reality 
TV, bacteriophobia, and sink waste 
disposals. Germans cannot resist watch-
ing in awe as those hidden monsters 
swallow anything you flush down the 
drain. Bacteriophobia can actually get 
annoying when you spend Thanksgiving 
weekend with 12 host-relatives, three of 
which have bad colds. I saw a new peak in 
bacteria alerts when a noro virus spread 
in the undergrad cafeteria, causing 
about 150 people to become violently ill. 
Bacteriophobia can be an advantage if 
you are sick, though: whatever you touch 
automatically becomes yours.
2
Public safety alerts are e-mails sent out 
to all students by the university’s safety 
department whenever something hap-
pens. Most of the time, this is something 
bad, like a mugging. Recently I have been 
receiving e-mails about girls getting their 
“buttocks” grabbed right on my street! 
Weber, where were you last night?
3
Rodents, raccoons and other animals. 
As my Grandpa keeps saying: Is this 
the country famous for its progress? 
After I let the spiders in my room eat the 
flies and the bed bugs emigrated more 
or less on their own, I was bothered to 
detect mice under my floorboards. I gave 
peaceful symbiosis an honest try, but then 
Heinrich the mouse was killed by mice-
ghostbusters with sticky paper (which is 
so cruel it is actually illegal in Germany). 
Fortunately, the big animals—namely a 
rat and a raccoon—stay in the backyard 
snacking on our waste. But hey, how else 
would I have learnt that you do not call 
these furry beasts “wash bears”?
4
The strange mixture of rich Conservative 
old people and rich soon-to-be Con-
servative college kids. The building to our 
left is full of college girls who regularly 
throw midday song-and-dance parties to 
Cindy Lauper’s “Girls Just Wanna Have 
Fun.” The family on our right is headed by 
your typical desperate housewife, who got 
so mad about a 10-to-midnight party at 
our house that she wrote a 10-page letter 
to off-campus housing. Who knew the 
university had any business regulating 
how loud our parties are!? I found out 
the hard way when a random guy showed 
up at our house a few days later to tell 
us to come to his office to discuss our 
mischievous behaviour, “or else there 
would be consequences”. Fortunately, the 
only consequence was the repeated theft 
of our garbage bin, and you can all guess 
who that was.
Lina Huppertz is a student 
of the HSoG ( class of 2009 ). 
She holds a BA in European 
Studies from the Universität 
Passau, Germany. Lina 
 Huppertz has interned with 
Allianz, the Institute for 
 Political Education of North-
Rhine Westphalia and the 
German Parliament. 
5
The horrible grease-seller Wisey’s that 
will not accept German IDs. Any foreigner 
who has been to the U.S. probably knows 
the feeling when an American cashier 
takes a look at your ID as if you just took it 
out of a Mickey Mouse magazine. It would 
not be so bad if it was not the only shop 
in the area that sells alcohol. And as if 
that was not bad enough, all stores have 
to stop selling alcohol at 9:45 pm! Wow. 
That requires more planning capacity 
and causes more anxiety than I can 
sometimes handle. Apart from being the 
local alcohol monopolist, Wisey’s sells 
grease in the form of subs for which they 
build a pile of about 500 chicken breasts 
in the early evening. Lesson: never go to 
Wisey’s before 6.
6 
Elections, Republicans, Democrats and 
other people without brains. By now I am 
convinced that half of all books written 
in the U.S. revolve around the following 
question: which party is the dumbest; or, 
in the words of Ann Coulter: “It’s as if all 
the brain-damaged people in America got 
together and formed a voting bloc.” But 
who doesn’t love a good political celebrity 
death-match with pundits like Ann 
Coulter throwing anti-Muslim arguments 
like “We should invade their countries, 
kill their leaders and convert them to 
Christianity” around? God loves Germany 
for party variety and for laws preventing 
people like Ann Coulter from speaking 
publicly (I hope that what’s Volksverhetzung 
is for).
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Visit Schlossplatz3 online 
All Schlossplatz3 content is available online. You can read articles 
and download back issues in .pdf format at the Hertie School 
of Governance website. Just go to www.hertie-school.org/
schlossplatz3/, then click “Printed” on the right side of the page. 
Schlossplatz3 in the Blogosphere
In January 2008, Schlossplatz3 went online with its own blog. 
The blog regularly features articles and interviews by prominent 
policy experts from around the world, as well as contributions  
from students, faculty and visitors of the Hertie School of 
Governance. Readers can also comment on articles in the blog, 
print edition, or other policy topics by e-mailing us at  
sp3@mpp.hertie-school.org . You can find the Schlossplatz3 blog at 
www.hertie-school.org/schlossplatz3
Correction
The editors of Schlossplatz3 would like to offer their sincere 
apologies to Peter Bosshard, Policy Director of International Rivers, 
Berkeley, California, whose name we misspelled in issue five,  
on Water, published in September 2008.
Next Issue 
Is it appropriate to speak about crisis all the time and in connection 
to every and any topic? By overusing this word, does not one 
undermine what a real crisis is? And how should we manage crisis? 
That is a question for policymakers! Interested? The seventh issue of 
Schlossplatz3, on Crisis, will appear in September 2009. 
The Crisis issue will focus on the actors and procedures behind 
responding to crises. 
With a focus on the ways in which crises are managed, it will 
incorporate perspectives from individual policy makers, multilateral 
organisations, think tanks, NGOs, private firms, academics 
and students alike.  The issue will cover questions of legitimacy, 
accountability, rationality, and ethics to name a few.
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Executive Seminars 2009
For more information and to register,
please contact us.
Tim Nover,
Acting Head of Executive Education
Phone: +49 (0)30 - 259 219 -130
Email: executive@hertie-school.org
www.hertie-school.org/executive
”I found the seminar extremely
rewarding and enjoyed exchanging
opinions with people from other
institutions. I look forward to my next
chance to participate in Executive
Education at the Hertie School of
Governance.“
Thomas Schieb
German Federal Foreign Office
9 – 11 March Performance Management in the Public Sector
Convener: Professor Dr. Gerhard Hammerschmid, Hertie School of Governance
30 March – 1 April Managing Organisational Change
Convener: Professor Dr. Jobst Fiedler, Hertie School of Governance
2 – 4 April Corporate Social Responsibility:
Regulatory Tools and their Application
Convener: Professor Dr. Anke Hassel, Hertie School of Governance
11 – 13 May Smart Decisions in Government
Conveners: Professor Lawrence Phillips, London School of Economics and Political
Science; Dr. Martin Schilling, Decision Institute
8 – 10 June Strategic Political Communication
Convener: Dr. Leonard Novy, Bertelsmann Foundation
All seminars will be held in English. The seminars are offered in cooperation with
the Executive Master of Public Management Programme.

